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Inducing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) requires that participants look at an imitation hand
while it is stroked in synchrony with their occluded biological hand. Previous explanations
of the RHI have emphasized multisensory integration, and excluded higher cognitive
functions. We investigated the relationship between the RHI and higher cognitive
functions by experimentally testing task switch (as measured by switch cost) and mind
wandering (as measured by SART score); we also included a questionnaire for attentional
control that comprises two subscales, attention-shift and attention-focus. To assess
experience of RHI, the Botvinick and Cohen (1998) questionnaire was used and illusion
onset time was recorded. Our results indicate that rapidity of onset reliably indicates
illusion strength. Regression analysis revealed that participants evincing less switch cost
and higher attention-shift scores had faster RHI onset times, and that those with higher
attention-shift scores experienced the RHI more vividly. These results suggest that the
multi-sensory hypothesis is not sufficient to explain the illusion: higher cognitive functions
should be taken into account when explaining variation in the experience of ownership
for the rubber hand.
Keywords: rubber hand illusion, task switch, attention control, executive functions, body ownership
INTRODUCTION
Plasticity of bodily experience, once a subject suited only to fictional characterization (Melzack,
1992) and philosophical speculation (de Vignemont, 2011a), has become a focus of intense
experimental research. Tastevin (1937) laid the groundwork for this research with an observation
concerning “visual capture”: the simple act of seeing a plastic finger that protrudes from a piece
of cloth is sufficient to cause one to feel illusory sensations on one’s concealed biological hand.
This illusion seems to be caused by visual dominance over other sensory modalities. Botvinick and
Cohen (1998) expanded upon Tastevin’s finding by developing an experimental paradigm in which
a participant’s occluded biological hand is stroked in synchrony with a visible rubber hand. This
induction procedure evokes what has been dubbed the “rubber hand illusion” (RHI)—among other
things, tactile sensations seem to occur on the rubber hand and the rubber hand seems to belong to
self (Botvinick, 2004).
The most commonly invoked explanation for the RHI, the Multi-Sensory Hypothesis (MSH)
emphasizes multisensory integration among visual, somatosensory, proprioceptive, and other
signals that operate within a body-centered coordinate system (Makin et al., 2008; Grivaz et al.,
2017). Although the precise roles played by sensory signals like proprioception (Rohde et al., 2011;
Abdulkarim and Ehrsson, 2016) and by peripersonal space (Makin et al., 2008) are contested, that
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the body’s sensory signals are referenced to the body’s position is
widely accepted (e.g., Durgin et al., 2007). In other words, sensory
information from both the body and the space adjacent to the
body are integrated in such a way as to distinguish between what
belongs to self and what belongs to the external world. Indeed,
parts of that which is external to the body, the peripersonal, can
be experienced as belonging to self. It is in virtue of this ongoing,
dynamic process that body parts are felt to be owned by or belong
to the self. Indeed, Ehrsson (2012, p. 788) avers that MSH is
sufficient to explain body ownership, and thatMSH has the added
beauty of being parsimonious because it “does not require the
inclusion of higher cognitive functions.”
Despite acknowledging that multisensory processing might be
the main cause of the RHI, Tsakiris disputes the sufficiency claim
(Tsakiris, 2010, 2011, 2017): First, he observes that visual form
and anatomical congruency matter—i.e., the shape of a rubber
hand must resemble an actual hand for it to be experienced
as belonging to self (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003). Second,
posture and spatial boundaries matter too: if the postures
of rubber and biological hands are incongruent (Constantini
and Haggard, 2007) or the distance between the two exceeds
30 cm (Lloyd, 2007), the illusion either disappears or is diluted.
In other words, a pre-existing, normative model of the body
constrains the RHI. Third, he adduces evidence to show that
the “filtering” mechanism whereby an object is “tested” to see
whether it coheres with the pre-existing model is independent
of multisensory processing (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2008). And,
fourth, exteroceptive signals like vision and touch, must be
integrated with interoceptive signals like those that emanate
from the cardiovascular system (Tsakiris, 2011, 2017; Moseley
et al., 2012). This integral relationship between exteroceptive
and interoceptive signals is evinced in many other respects as
well, including discovery that histamine reactivity increases in
the biological hand, correlating with disownership experiences
(Barnsley et al., 2011).
It seems clear that multi-sensory processes alone are not
sufficient to explain the RHI, and that a normative body model as
well as interoceptive processing need also be taken into account.
Of course achieving a more complete explanation will require
greater nuance as, for example, simple distance probably does
not constrain in the way described above; a more complex model
that limns the interplay of spatial and temporal parameters is
needed (Zopf et al., 2010; Constantini et al., 2016). But these
additions do contribute to explanatory adequacy, while at the
same time being broadly consistent with Ehrsson’s desideratum
that the explanation be parsimonious, because like MSH neither
of these additions involve higher cognitive functions.
Adequate scientific explanations, however, should do
more than merely explain what happens; they should also
explain why, under like circumstances, there is variability,
even the failure to occur (Lipton, 2004). Evidence from
multiple investigations—evidence that is consistent with our
findings—shows that when standardized induction procedures
for the RHI are employed, variability is the norm (e.g., Botvinick,
2004; Kanayama et al., 2009; Marotta et al., 2016), even to
the extent that approximately one-third of participants fail to
experience the illusion (e.g., Ehrsson et al., 2004; Durgin et al.,
2007; Lloyd, 2007). No doubt to some degree this variability
is explainable by multi-sensory processes, duly complemented
by a normative model of the body and by integration with
interoceptive processes. Ehrsson (2012, p. 783), however,
acknowledges that currently we are unable to explain variability
within or “immunity” to the illusion, and conjectures that these
phenomena might be understood with respect to differences in
the degree to which people rely on proprioceptive information.
But multiple studies suggest that proprioception does not
strongly correlate with the illusion (e.g., Zopf et al., 2010; Rohde
et al., 2011) or, to that extent that the two do correlate, it is
the illusion—the conscious experience—that causally affects
proprioception, not the reverse (Abdulkarim and Ehrsson, 2016).
This renders implausible the suggestion that greater reliance
upon proprioception could play the conjectured role.
Of course some further tweaking of the MSH might enhance
its explanatory adequacy, but the problem may reside elsewhere,
perhaps with the disinclination to consider a possible role played
by higher cognitive functions. Although the received view of
multisensory integration is that it is automatic and pre-attentive,
a variety of theoretical considerations and recent experimental
findings suggest that top-down attention can interact with
integrative processes so as to enhance clarity, reduce ambiguity,
facilitate feature-binding, and so forth (Talsma et al., 2012).
Indeed, an association between bimodal integration and attention
has been demonstrated already by several studies (Spence and
Driver, 1997; Gondan et al., 2011).
Especially noteworthy are investigations of audiovisual
integrative processing: Talsma et al. (2007) discovered that
full attention to both modalities is necessary for successful
integration. And, not only has the Talsma et al. finding been
reconfirmed, attention has also been shown to play a role in
modulating the activation of bimodal and unimodal regions—
e.g., the superior temporal sulcus and the extrastriate cortex
(Morís Fernández et al., 2015). In contrast, with the exception
of Wahn and König (2015), far less scrutiny has been given to
how attention or other higher cognitive functions might affect
integration of touch and vision, to say nothing of proprioception.
Accordingly, in view of the explanatory failings encountered
when higher cognitive functions are neglected as well as
findings concerning the influence of top-down attention, we
determined to investigate the possibility that executive functions
are modulating the RHI.
Among various executive functions, attention-related
constructs like mind wandering and task switching appear
to be especially relevant to the RHI. Mind wandering occurs
when executive components of attention shift away from
external tasks to internal thoughts and feelings (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006, 2015). It signals a failure of executive
control to block the interference of those internal thoughts on
a primary external task (McVay and Kane, 2010) and, at the
same time, it signals a redirection of those executive resources
to endogenously generated mental contents (Christoff et al.,
2009). Task switching, on the other hand, which is taken to be
at the very “nexus” of executive control (Schneider and Logan,
2009), enables people to redirect their attention away from the
endogenous and back to the external (Hofmann et al., 2012).
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Conceptually, there might be some resistance to treating
the RHI as involving a task, especially since the focus here is
only on experienced ownership of a body part, not an action,
which are distinct types of belonging experience (Tsakiris et al.,
2010a,b; Lane, 2014). But task switching can be thought of as
an indicator of cognitive flexibility (Diamond, 2013), and on
some accounts the RHI self-reported questionnaires are taken
to be measurements more of judged rather than experienced
ownership (de Vignemont, 2011b). If we allow that judgment
plays some role in the RHI, then we have opened the door
to higher cognitive functions, and flexibility of function is an
important part of enabling a subject to report that a rubber hand
belongs to self.
Yet, to our knowledge, no study has examined directly
the degree to which these executive functions might influence
multisensory integration. Hence, the present study is designed
to do just that, to investigate the relationship among the RHI,
task switch, and mind wandering. We conjecture that a role
of executive functions in the RHI is to refocus participants’
attention to external task-related stimuli, resulting in stronger
RHI experiences. On the other hand, we conjecture that it
is less likely for mind wanderers to experience the rubber
hand belonging to self. We further conjecture that people
who are better at task switching might be more efficient at
refocusing attention onto the illusory experience, which may
in turn enhance the vividness and quicken the onset time
of the RHI.
To complement task switch andmindwandering experiments,
because top-down attention plays a significant role in audiovisual
integration, we added an Attentional Control Scale, in order
to determine whether persons who are better at attentional
control would also have a more pronounced RHI experience.
Attentional Control Scale items comprise two parts: attention-
focus and attention-shift. As the terms suggest, attention-focus
items are used to estimate participants’ capacity to stay engaged,
and attention-shift items are used to estimate participants’
aptitude for shifting attention. Based on our conjecture that
higher executive function enables individuals to refocus their
attention to the external task-related stimuli—stroking of the
rubber and biological hands—we expected that participants with
better attentional control would also evince early onset and
robust experience of the RHI.
It should be born inmind that the purpose of our investigation
is to provide a sufficient explanation of a particular type of
conscious experience—the sensation that a rubber hand belongs
to self. The role that we suggest is being played by top-
down attentional mechanisms is consistent with the role played
by top-down attention in more comprehensive theories of
conscious experience, such as the global neuronal workspace
hypothesis (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2010b):
that is, top-down attention seems to be a necessary condition
that enables preconscious or subliminal processes to become
consciously reportable. Although we are agnostic as to whether
this hypothesis succeeds as a general theory of consciousness, it
does seem applicable to the RHI.
Our hypothesis is that the role of executive function in RHI is
to refocus cognitive resources from internal thoughts to external,
task-related stimuli. Participants with higher mind wandering
rates should respond to the RHI more slowly and experience it
less robustly, as a result of their inclination to attend to internal
thoughts rather than the external stimuli. In shifting attention to
the external stimuli, there should be switch costs that accompany
the shift. By hypothesis, participants with less switch cost are
expected to respond to RHI faster. Moreover, the strength of
the RHI correlates with whether participants are able to shift
attention to external stimuli.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-six adults, including students and members of the general
public, were recruited from the National Taiwan University and
surrounding neighborhoods. All gave informed consent, had
normal or suitably corrected-vision, were compensated for their
participation, and were naïve to the purpose of RHI experiment.
The study followed Human Subject Ethics Guidelines and
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of
Psychology at the National Taiwan University.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Rubber Hand Illusion
All participants were tested individually in a small and quiet
room. Since earlier work suggests a right hemispheric dominance
for body ownership experience (Ocklenburg et al., 2011), our
current experiment was administered only to each participant’s
left hand and a corresponding rubber hand was employed. The
experimenter stood in front of each seated participant who was
asked to extend both arms on the table with palms facing down.
Then, each participant inserted his/her actual left hand into a
black cardboard tube so the left hand would be out of sight, from
the participant’s perspective. The rubber hand was placed next
to the hidden real hand, within the participant’s field of vision.
A blanket was placed over the tube such that it covered each
participant’s elbow and forearm, as well as the space separating
the rubber hand from his/her torso. Finally, the experimenter
used two paintbrushes to stroke both the actual and the rubber
hand.
Each participant was exposed to two conditions with
order counterbalanced: synchronous and asynchronous. In both
conditions, the experimenter stroked the participant’s real hand
and the rubber hand from thumb to little finger and back,
at a pace of approximately once per 2 s, for 3min. In the
synchronous condition, the experimenter stroked both the real
hand and the rubber hand simultaneously. In the asynchronous
condition, the experimenter alternated between the real hand
and the rubber hand. Botvinick and Cohen (1998) found that
participants reported an experience of ownership for the rubber
hand when strokes were applied in synchrony. Because the
ownership experience does not occur when stokes are applied
in an asynchronous manner, it seems that synchronization of
visual and tactile information is essential for the RHI (cf.
Constantini et al., 2016). Therefore, we follow the convention
in the RHI literature to use the asynchronous condition as
the baseline to ensure that the RHI is indeed induced by the
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synchronous strokes, and not by visual or tactile sensations alone
(or both). Two foot-pedals placed under the participant’s feet
were connected to a computer in order to measure the onset time
of subjective ownership or belonging, which is the specific aspect
of the RHI that we investigated. Participants were instructed to
step on the left pedal as soon as the stroking began and to step
on the right pedal as soon as they began to experience the rubber
hand as part of self.
Touch referral is, arguably, the most distinctive perceptual
event associated with the illusion, but the RHI can be induced
even when participants cannot see the hand, and the experience
of ownership has a richer phenomenology (Ehrsson, 2012).
Accordingly, we concerned ourselves with ownership, the respect
in which the rubber hand is experienced as belonging to self
(Lane, 2012, 2015). Unfortunately, several studies have raised
doubts about the reliability of proprioceptive drift, a commonly
used behavioral proxy, as an indicator of the ownership
experience for the rubber hand (e.g., Ehrsson et al., 2004;
Kammers et al., 2009; Zopf et al., 2010; Rohde et al., 2011).
Indeed, it even seems to be the case that when drift and ownership
experience are positively correlated, it is the conscious experience
that causes drift, not the reverse (Abdulkarim and Ehrsson, 2016).
Accordingly, for the purpose of investigating the ownership
experience, we developed a new, online proxy. We discovered
that asking participants to indicate the moment they begin to
experience the rubber hand as belonging to self is a highly
reliable measure of illusion strength (Lane et al., 2017). This
technique enabled us to investigate the RHI’s temporal dynamics,
providing in-the-moment rather than only retrospective data,
thereby introducing a new methodological approach.
In fact, despite the highly suggestive environment of the
RHI induction, many participants, nevertheless, reported no
sensation whatsoever, showing that this technique is a useful
tool for measuring variation with the RHI. Moreover, we have
previously established that onset time can be effectively employed
in concert with questionnaires (Lane et al., 2017), such as
the nine-item questionnaire created by Botvinick and Cohen
(1998). As indicated by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), only items
one to three exhibited statistical significance in production of
affirmative responses. Therefore, for this study we measured the
strength or intensity of the RHI (Morgan et al., 2011) by only
taking the mean of items one to three in the Botvinick and Cohen
questionnaire. Also, just as in Botvinick and Cohen (1998), each
item is rated from−3 to 3.
Mind Wandering
In order to determine individual variation in mind wandering—
the degree to which minds wander from the current task to
private thoughts or feelings (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006)—we
used a modified version of the Robertson et al. (1997) Sustained
Attention to Response Task (SART). It is a continuous “Go” or
“No-go” task that requires participants to respond to all non-
targets (letters of the alphabet, except C) by pressing down
on the space bar as quickly as possible. When the target, the
letter “C,” appears, participants were required to inhibit response
(viz., perform no action). The target to non-target ratio was
1:19. During the administration of SART, 30 thought probes
were inserted pseudo-randomly. These probes comprised three
options, all pertaining to what participants were thinking about
immediately prior to the probe. Participants were required to
indicate whether their thoughts concerned (a) the task, (b)
task performance, or (c) matters irrelevant to the task. Thus,
mind wandering is defined as the degree to which participants’
thoughts prior to the probe are irrelevant to the task, and the
degree of mind wandering was calculated as the ratio of task-
irrelevant responses for the 30 thought probes.
Task Switching
Similar to the standard task switch paradigm, participants were
asked to make binary judgments. They had to decide (1) whether
digits that appeared on the screen were odd or even (when
they appeared on the upper field), or (2) whether they were
greater than or less than five (when they appeared on the lower
field). Ability to switch between the two tasks was assessed
by comparing the reaction times (RTs) in task-switch trials
(switching from one task to another) and task-repetition trials
(consecutive performance of the same task). See Figure 1 for
details (adapted from Erickson et al., 2008). We predicted that
task-switch trials would prolong RT relative to task-repetition
trials. Thus, adeptness at switching could be determined by
calculating the average RT delay for all participants—individuals
with shorter delay would be more proficient at switching.
Participants were first given one practice block of 30 trials.
Next, we gave them a total of four blocks, each of which
comprised 60 trials. We then measured the RTs of the task-
repetition and task-switch trials, and calculated the switch cost
(i.e., the difference between mean RTs of task-switch trials and
task-repetition trials).
Attentional Control Scale
The Attentional Control Scale (see Appendix) is designed to
explore distinct aspects of attentional control (Derryberry and
Reed, 2002): items one to nine concern the ability to attention-
focus; items 10–20 concern the ability to attention-shift.
Attention-focus items are subjective reports of a participant’s
capacity to stay engaged (e.g., “When trying to focus my
attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out distracting
thoughts”). On the other hand, attention-shift items are
subjective reports of a participant’s aptitude for shifting attention
from one task to another (e.g., “It takes me a while to get really
involved in a new task”). After completing the experiment, two
scores were calculated: the average for attention-focus and the
average for attention-shift.
Design and Procedure
Administration order of the RHI, Mind Wandering, and
Task Switch were counterbalanced across participants. The
Attentional Control Scale was administered after the first three
had been completed.
RESULTS
Rubber Hand Illusion
To analyze the RHI questionnaire ratings, a t-test was performed
in order to test the difference between the mean of items one to
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FIGURE 1 | An example of the task switch procedure. A fixation cross is situated at the center of a screen and a series of digits (1–4, 6–9) appear in the surrounding
quadrants. Participants were asked to press key “A” on a standard qwerty keyboard when digits were odd and on the upper field, or when digits were greater than five
and on the lower field; participants were asked to press key “;” on the same standard qwerty keyboard when digits were even and on the upper field, or less than five
and on the lower field. Consecutive tasks that require the same type of judgment—e.g., deciding whether upper field digits are odd–count as task-repetition trials.
Consecutive tasks that require different types of judgment—e.g., first deciding whether a lower field digit is greater than five, then deciding whether an upper field digit
is odd–count as task-switch trials.
three under the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions
(Figure 2A). The main effect, reflecting this difference, was
significant [t(35) = 7.3944, p < 0.001]. This finding suggests
that participant’s RHI experience was stronger or more intense
when stroking was synchronous than when it was asynchronous.
For the onset time data, the t-test that concerned the difference
between synchronous and asynchronous stroking (Figure 2B)
showed that the main effect, reflecting this difference, was
significant [t(35) = −6.3785, p < 0.001]. This result suggests that
participants experienced the illusion (viz., feeling the rubber hand
belongs to self) quicker when stroking was synchronous than
when it was asynchronous.
Additionally, we discovered a correlation between mean RHI,
as indicated by onset time for ownership, and RHI strength,
as indicated by the mean of items one to three (r = −0.74,
p < 0.001, Figure 2C), when the asynchronous condition was
subtracted from the synchronous condition. The RHI strength
was calculated in this manner because we took the score in
the asynchronous conditions as the baseline. This correlation
implies that the more vivid or the stronger the experience of the
RHI, the earlier is the onset of experienced ownership for the
rubber hand. These findings concerning the relationship between
questionnaire and onset time ratings are consistent with our
previous findings (Lane et al., 2017).
Hierarchical Regression Analyses
To investigate how the RHI experience was affected by different
aspects of executive function, we conducted two hierarchical
regressions with the onset time of the RHI and the RHI
questionnaire ratings as dependent variables respectively. The
regression analysis of the RHI onset time could reveal how
executive functions affect the temporal dynamics of experiencing
the RHI, whereas the regression analysis of the RHI questionnaire
ratings could reveal how executive functions affect the intensity
of the RHI.
Based on the hypothesis mentioned in the Introduction
section, we entered executive function predictors in the following
order: (1) the SART score in the mind wandering task, (2) the
attention-shift rating in the attentional control scale, (3) the
switch cost in the task switching task, and (4) the attention-focus
rating in the attentional control scale.
Hierarchical Regression of the Onset Time
of RHI
The results of the hierarchical regression on the RHI onset time
are shown in Table 1. These results showed that the increased
R2 between Model 2 and Model 1 [F(1, 33) = 6.7606, p < 0.05],
and the increased R2 between Model 3 and Model 2 [F(1, 32) =
4.7496, p < 0.05] were both significant, but the increased R2
between Model 3 and Model 4 was not significant [F(1, 31) =
0.8113, p = 0.3747]. That is, Model 3 explains the onset time of
the RHI better thanModel 2 andModel 1; however, Model 4 does
not explain the onset time better than Model 3. Therefore, we
chose Model 3 to explain the results of the RHI onset time, since
Model 3 could explain the variance of the onset time with fewer
predictors. In Model 3, the attention-shift ratings were negatively
related to the onset time of the RHI [t(32) = −2.243, p < 0.05],
while the switch costs were positively related to the onset time of
the RHI [t(32) = 2.186, p < 0.05]. This suggests that participants
who could shift their attention from one task to another with less
switch cost could respond more quickly to the RHI experience
(Figure 3).
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FIGURE 2 | (A) The difference in RHI questionnaire ratings between synchronous and asynchronous conditions (B) The difference in onset time between synchronous
and asynchronous conditions. The error bars in both (A) and (B) represent standard errors (SE) of the mean. (C) Correlation between RHI strength—the difference in
mean for items one to three, as rated by RHI questionnaire between synchronous and asynchronous conditions—and onset time for RHI.
TABLE 1 | Results of the hierarchical regression analysis of the RHI onset time.
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mind wandering (SART
score)
31.17 −8.926 −7.172 −8.925
Attention-shift rating −64.849* −56.449* −45.156*
Task switch (switch
cost)
101.699* 106.271
Attention-focus rating −28.467
R2 0.0145 0.1683 0.2764 0.2948
∆R2 0.1538 0.1081 0.0184
F 0.502 3.34* 4.074* 3.24*
F of increased R2 6.7606* 4.7496* 0.8113
*p < 0.05.
Hierarchical Regression of the RHI
Questionnaire Ratings
The results of the hierarchical regression of the RHI
questionnaire ratings are shown in Table 2. These results
showed that only the difference of R2 between Model 1 and
Model 2 was significant [F(1, 33) = 3.346, p < 0.05]. This finding
suggests that Model 2 explains the variance of RHI questionnaire
ratings better than Model 1. However, Model 3 and 4 do not
explain the RHI questionnaire ratings better than Model 2. In
Model 2, the attention-shift ratings were positively related to the
RHI questionnaire ratings [t(31) = 2.510, p < 0.05], suggesting
that the participants with higher attention-shift ratings have
stronger RHI experience (Figure 4).
In short, the results suggest that participants who are more
adept at shifting attention to the new task with less switch cost
would respond to the RHI faster (as indicated by the RHI onset
time), and the participants with higher attention-shift ratings
would experience stronger RHI (as indicated by the questionnaire
ratings). Together, our results suggest that cognitive flexibility is
a key factor for the RHI. The ability of shifting attention toward
external visual-tactile stimulation affects both the RHI onset time
and strength.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previously it has been supposed that MSH, when appropriately
supplemented, could provide sufficient explanations for the
RHI (Ehrsson, 2012). Partially in the interest of parsimony,
and partially because the additions made to MSH (e.g.,
Tsakiris, 2011, 2017; Moseley et al., 2012) seemed up to the
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FIGURE 3 | Correlations between the RHI onset time and (A) Attention-Shift Aptitude (B) Switch Cost (s) in Model 3.
TABLE 2 | Results of hierarchical regression analysis of The RHI questionnaire
rating.
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mind wandering (SART score) −0.6511 0.3788 0.3499 0.4056
Attention-shift rating 1.6658* 1.5274 1.1686
Task switch (switch cost) −1.6758 −1.8210
Attention-focus rating 0.9044
R2 0.0099 0.1686 0.2145 0.2436
∆R2 0.1587 0.0459 0.0291
F 0.341 3.346* 2.912 2.496
F of increased R2 6.5029* 1.8800 1.1937
*p < 0.05.
task of increasing MSH’s explanatory adequacy and scope,
higher cognitive functions were neglected. The intent of
our investigations has not been to suggest that multisensory
integration is inessential to experience of the RHI, nor indeed
to suggest that a pre-existing body model or interoception do
not contribute importantly to solving the explanatory puzzles
of embodiment. Instead, our intent has been to suggest that an
adequate explanation of the variable experiences of those who
undergo the RHI induction procedure will need to take into
account another factor—executive and other higher cognitive
functions.
Discussion of executive function’s role in this respect may
be counter-intuitive, since all healthy participants know that a
detached rubber hand could not belong to self. One might even
be inclined to think there is a need to inhibit executive functions
in order to experience the RHI, given the patent absurdity of
bodies adopting disconnected parts. But our findings suggest that
FIGURE 4 | Correlations between the RHI questionnaire rating and
attention-shift aptitude in Model 2.
adequate explanation of the presence of the illusion intensity
variation that is so often reported (e.g., Durgin et al., 2007;
Kanayama et al., 2009) might require inclusion of executive
functions playing specific roles. Foremost among these are
attention-involving executive functions, including task switch
and attention shift. Both seem to be playing a modulatory role.
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Indeed, it might be that a certain degree of the cognitive flexibility
that these contribute to our cognitive economy is a prerequisite
for the having of such an illusory experience.
Filippetti and Tsakiris (2017) recently showed that
participants’ accuracy on reporting their heartbeats, a
performance index of the ability to perceive internal bodily
signals, was improved after experiencing the RHI. Improvement
of interoceptive awareness, however, was only observed for
participants who exhibited relatively low accuracy before the
RHI experience. The authors suggest that body-ownership is a
hierarchical construct that is dependent upon multisensory
signals, and that synchronous visual-tactile stimulation
can improve the performance of participants on tasks of
interoceptive awareness. Their finding is consistent with
previous findings that attention to exteroceptive bodily signals
enhances processing of self-related information (Tsakiris et al.,
2007, 2011; Ainley et al., 2012; Maister and Tsakiris, 2014). These
findings seem to be compatible with ours, in the following way:
if task switch and attention shift are understood as indicators
of cognitive flexibility that are trainable, which appears to
be the case (Karbach and Kray, 2009; Diamond, 2013), then
the improvement of interoceptive awareness might be best
understood as a result of the RHI “training” sessions, sessions
that promote the ability to attend, flexibly, to sensory signals.
In this study, participants always filled in the Attentional
Control Scale after they completed all RHI, mind wandering,
and task switch experiments. One might wonder whether
this sequence biased participants’ responses. But items in the
Attentional Control Scale are not directly related to those tasks;
instead, they measure one’s attention capability, in general.
Therefore the observed effects in the present study should not be
influenced by the fixed order of the tasks and questionnaire.
One of the limitations of this study is that it concerns body
image representations, and is silent as regards body schema
representations. The standard RHI protocol, the one employed
here, comprises passive tactile stimulation and subjective report;
hence, it seems only to inform about body image, not body
schema, which typically involves sensorimotor coordination
(de Vignemont, 2010). In principle image and schema can
dissociate, but since our experiment involved no reaching,
grasping, or pointing, we leave for future studies to determine
whether executive functions can similarly modulate body schema
representations.
A second, further line of investigation suggested by our
findings concerns cognitive flexibility. In our effort to explain
variability of illusion experience, we have suggested that higher
cognitive functions are playing a modulatory role and that a
degree of cognitive flexibility might be a prerequisite for the
having of illusory conscious experiences of the sort on display
in the RHI. Because task switch and attention shift seem to be
trainable, we conjecture that relevant training, by promoting
the ability to attend, flexibly, to sensory signals, should enhance
performance on the RHI.
In the history of science, parsimony is widely regarded as
a pragmatic virtue, sometimes even as an epistemic virtue
(Quine, 1966). But premature ambitions to parsimony can
inhibit the development of science, resulting in theories of
limited explanatory scope. By taking higher cognitive functions
into consideration and by recognizing that executive functions
play an important role in the RHI, we position ourselves to
better explain variation in the experience of ownership, perhaps
even better explain why it is that one-third of people who
undergo the RHI induction fail to experience any illusion
whatsoever.
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APPENDIX
Attentional Control Scale. Items 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 20 were coded inversely, consistent with the method employed by
Derryberry and Reed (2002).
Focus attention 1. It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when there are noises around.
2. When I need to concentrate and solve a problem, I have trouble focusing my attention
3. When I am working hard on something, I still get distracted by events around me.
4. My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me.
5. When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that I become unaware of what’s going on in the room
around me.
6. When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted if there are people talking in the same room
7. When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out distracting thoughts.
8. I have a hard time concentrating when I’m excited about something.
9. When concentrating, I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst.
Shift attention 10. I can quickly switch from one task to another.
11. It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task.
12. It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between listening and writing required when taking notes
during lectures.
13. I can become interested in a new topic very quickly when I need to.
14. It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also talking on the phone.
15. I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once.
16. I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly.
17. After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily shift my attention back to what I was doing before.
18. When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy for me to shift my attention away from it.
19. It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks.
20. It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about something and look at it from another point of
view.
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